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INTRODUCTION 
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all 
available evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the Govern­
ment should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the 
means by which the evidence is to be obtained .... [F]or my part I think 
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government 
should play an ignoble part.1 
· 
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
* I am grateful for the support of my wife, Jenny, and son, Daniel. 
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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For over 100 years the United States judiciary has struggled with 
the sting2 and the entrapment defense,3 examining whether govern­
ment agents deviously manufacture crimes or merely afford criminals 
the opportunity to commit them.4 The sentiments of Justice Holmes 
were rare for his time, but today they are reflected in a growing sym­
pathy for sting victims.5 While courts are now more willing than ever 
to find entrapment,6 they still differ over the burden of proof that the 
government must satisfy to overthrow an entrapment defense.7 Spe-
2. A sting is an undercover police operation where police pose as criminals to trap law 
violators. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court has re­
peatedly emphasized that in a sting the government's role is solely to afford the opportunity 
to commit a crime. "It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the Govern­
ment merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not de­
feat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in 
criminal enterprises." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932). The government's 
endorsement of sting operations is based upon the government's ability to simulate reality. 
See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter 
Hollingsworth Il] ("[T]he government may not, in trying to induce the target of a sting to 
commit a crime, confront him with circumstances that are different from the ordinary or 
typical circumstances of a private inducement"). 
3. "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his pro­
curement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trick­
ery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
Entrapment is a defense to criminal prosecution in every jurisdiction in the United States. 
Tennessee was the last jurisdiction to recognize the defense. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58 
n.95 (1989). Entrapment is found where the government induced a defendant to commit a 
crime he was not predisposed to commit. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 
(1988). 
4. The entrapment defense first appeared in judicial opinions written in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. See Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878); Board of Comm'rs v. 
Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. 1864). A majority of the Supreme Court first expressed its 
distaste for manufactured crime in its finding of entrapment in Sorrells. "There is common 
agreement that where a law officer envisages a crime, plans it, and activates its commission 
by one not theretofore intending its perpetration, for the sole purpose of obtaining a victim 
through indictment, conviction and sentence, the consummation of so revolting a plan ought 
not to be permitted by any self respecting tribunal." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454. 
5. See generally PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRA,PMENT DEFENSE § 1.03 (2d ed. 1995) 
(documenting the evolution of entrapment in the United States). 
6. See Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 
47 FLA. L. REV. 205, 220 (1995). Marcus attributes this conclusion to the growing concern 
among judges throughout the country that undue involvement by the government may con­
stitute entrapment even where the defendant appeared willing to commit the crime. Id. at 
220. 
7. To convict a defendant who makes a colorable case that he was entrapped, the gov­
ernment must prove lack of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jacobson v. United 
States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992). Initially, to plead entrapment, the defendant must make a 
showing of improper government inducement. Then, "[t)o defeat a defense of entrapment 
the government must show either that it did not induce the defendants to commit the crime 
for which they are being prosecuted or, if it did, still they were predisposed to commit it." 
United States v. Hollingsworth, 9.F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Hollingsworth 1]. 
A defendant may show improper inducement by producing any evidence sufficient to 
raise concern " 'that the government's conduct created a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by a person other than the one ready to commit it.' . . This burden is 
light because a defendant is generally entitled to put a recognized defense to the jury where 
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cifically, courts disagree about whether the burden includes proof that 
the defendant had the ability and resources to commit the specific 
crime, so that if the government had not done so, it is likely that 
someone else would have induced the defendant to commit the crime.8 
This requirement is known as the "positional" factor or "readiness" 
element.9 
The prelude to this disagreement was the latest ruling of the 
United States Supreme Court in the entrapment arena. In Jacobson v. 
United States,10 the Supreme Court held that "[w]here the Government 
has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrap­
ment is at issue . . . the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior 
to first being approached by Government agents."11 
Since the Court's decision in Jacobson, the federal courts have at­
tempted to define and apply the Supreme Court's standard of "predis­
position." The two approaches that have attracted the greatest atten­
tion, because of their direct and particular conflict, have distilled the 
Jacobson inquiry into a multifactored analysis to determine the pre­
disposition of a defendant.12 
sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find in her favor." United States v. Brown, 
43 F.3d 618, 623 {11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Dickens, 524 
F.2d 441, 444 {5th Cir. 1975)). Inducement may be satisfied by little more than a suggestion 
or an opportunity to commit a crinle. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52. In Jacobson v. United 
States, the government did not offer the defendant any inducements nor did the government 
threaten him, and the defendant never resisted committing the crinle, but nonetheless the 
government had to prove predisposition. See United States v. Hollingswortll, 27 F.3d 1196, 
1199 {7th Cir. 1994) {highlighting the "unquestionably peculiar" facts in the Supreme 
Court's Jacobson case). 
8. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1200 (arguing in favor of proof of ability 
and resources). But see United States v. Thickstun, 110 F3d 1394, 1398 {9th Cir. 1997) (re­
fusing to adopt such a "positional" requirement). 
9. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F3d at 1199-1200. 
10. 503 U.S. 540 {1992) {finding entrapment where a sting led to the unlawful receipt 
and possession of child pornography). 
11. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548-49 (emphasis added). Since Jacobson, courts have empha­
sized the initial conversation between the government agent and the defendant, and the de­
fendant's reactions to that conversation, as evidence of the defendant's pre-contact disposi­
tion. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 964 {1st Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Goulding, 26 F.3d 656, 665 {7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 {9th 
Cir. 1992). 
12. To date, four different analyses have been advanced by circuit courts. Two courts 
have defined "predisposition" so broadly as to provide minimal guidance beyond Jacobson. 
See United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 {11th Cir. 1995) (commenting that predisposi­
tion is a "subjective inquiry into a defendant's state of mind . . .  [and it] cannot be reduced to 
any enumerated list of factors for a reviewing court to examine"); Gendron, 18 F.3d at 964 
(concluding that a defendant's predisposition can be resolved by asking how he would react 
to an ordinary opportunity to commit a specific crinle). 
Due to the generality of the First and Eleventh Circuits' approaches, no court has ex­
plicitly disagreed with either of their holdings. Even the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which 
are at odds with each other, both claim to comply with the First and Eleventh Circuits' 
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In United States v. Skarie, the Ninth Circuit employed a five-factor 
test to assess predisposition.13 The test analyzes: (1) the character of 
the defendant, (2) whether the government agent or the defendant 
first suggested the criminal activity, (3) whether the defendant en­
gaged in the activity for profit, ( 4) whether the defendant demon­
strated reluctance, and (5) the nature and timing of the government's 
inducement.14 In United States v. Hollingsworth,15 the Seventh Circuit 
amended the Skarie five-factor test16 by adding a readiness element.17 
This element evaluates the readiness and ability of the defendant to 
commit the crime. 
In Hollingsw01th the court stated that the proper victim of a sting 
is a predisposed person, "ready and willing"18 to commit an offense be-
analyses. See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997); Hollingsworth 
II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199. Furthermore, when the Fifth Circuit approached the issue, 
it regarded Hollingsworth II as the dividing line in entrapment doctrine, and regarded itself 
as siding either with or against the Hollingsworth II court, disregarding the generality and 
ambiguity of the First and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802 (5th 
Cir. 1997), aff d en bane on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 973 (1998). Finally, the First and Eleventh Circuit ap­
proaches have not attracted the scholarly attention granted to Hollingsworth JI. See, e.g., 
Lori J. Rankin, Casenote, Entrapment: A Defense for the Willing, Yet Unready, Criminal?, 
63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1487 (1995); Elliot Rothstein, Note, Criminal Law - United States v. 
Hollingsworth: The Entrapment Defense and the Neophyte Criminal - When the Commis­
sion of a Criminal Act does not Constitute a Crime, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 303 (1995). 
These notes both side against the Hollingsworth II majority. They summarize and evaluate 
the arguments proffered by the Hollingsworth II dissent and other dissenting courts but do 
not provide any further analysis of the readiness requirement. 
13. 971 F2d 317 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding entrapment where a sting led to the unlawful 
possession of narcotics with intent to distribute); see also Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1396 (siding 
with the Skarie method of analysis and affirming a conviction for bribing an Internal Reve· 
nue Service ("IRS") agent). 
14. See Skarie, 971 F.2d at 320. The Ninth Circuit has further held that "the most impor­
tant factor is whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance to engage in the crime which 
was overcome by repeated government inducement." United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 
1152 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming a conviction for conspiracy and attempting to use counterfeit 
access credit cards). 
15. Within the text of this Note, all references to Hollingsworth refer to Hollingsworth II 
unless otherwise noted. 
16. Although the majority never explicitly listed or examined any of the factors, it ap­
peared to endorse the five-factor test set forth in Skarie. Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 
F.3d at 1205 n.1 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("Our circuit examines five criteria to determine 
predisposition: '(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether .. .' "). See 
Thomas G. Briody, The Government Made Me Do It - The Changing Landscape on the 
Law of Entrapment, RI.BJ., March 1997, at 16. 
17. The Seventh Circuit first announced this requirement in Hollingsworth I, supra note 
7, 9 F.3d 593, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding entrapment where a sting led to money laun­
dering) and affirmed it in Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). 
The Fifth Circuit has also adopted the additional factor. See Knox, 112 F.3d at 807 (finding 
entrapment where a sting led to money laundering). Recently, the Fifth Circuit, while re­
viewing the Knox decision en bane, denounced, in dicta, the readiness requirement. See 
Brace, 145 F.3d at 260. 
18. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992). 
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fore the government establishes a criminal scheme.19 The 
Hollingsworth court noted that circuit courts had been finding that a 
defense of entrapment failed in any case when the defendant was 
"willing,'' in the sense of being psychologically prepared, to commit 
the crime for which he was being prosecuted.20 Thus, these courts de­
clared defendants willing, even when it was plain that they would not 
have engaged in criminal activity unless inveigled or assisted by the 
government.21 Hollingsworth reasoned that through the Jacobson de­
cision, the Supreme Court intended the readiness requirement to cur­
tail circuit courts' limitation of the entrapment defense.22 
The Hollingsworth court further held that predisposition is not 
purely a mental state but has a readiness component as well.23 Under 
Hollingsworth, the government must prove that "[t]he defendant [is] 
so situated by reason of previous training or experience or occupation 
or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not in­
duced him to commit the crime some criminal would have done so."24 
For example, in the case of crimes that demand experience or connec­
tions that cannot be presumed, such as money laundering and drug 
manufacturing, the government must prove that the defendant had the 
essential tools to commit the crime without its intervention.25 This 
burden may include a showing that the defendant had prior knowl­
edge on the art of laundering and connections to indispensable per­
sons,26 or in the case of drug manufacturing, an independent distribu­
tion chain for a drug manufacturing operation.27 
This readiness element requires a showing by the government that 
the crime was more than a thought in the defendant's mind.28 For in-
19. Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199. 
20. Id. at 1198 (citing to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 
41 (2d Cir. 1989), "and other decisions"). 
2L Id. 
22 Id. 
23. Id. at 1199. 
24. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). 
25. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199. In cases that do not require ex­
traordinary experience or contacts (noncomplex or "garden-variety" crimes), such as brib­
ery, illegal gun sales, drug dealing, and other traditional targets of stings, the court will as­
sume ability and expect the prosecution to prove only the defendant's willingness to violate 
the law without extraordinary inducements to satisfy the predispositional burden. See id. at 
1200; see infra text accompanying notes 108-111. 
26. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1202 ("[T]o get into the international 
money-laundering business you need underworld contacts, financial acumen or assets, or 
access to foreign banks or bankers, or other assets."). 
27. See United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that "there 
could not have been the manufacture, delivery, or sale of the illicit drug had it not been for 
the Government's supply of one of the essential ingredients"). 
28. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199. 
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stance, assume an individual, Joe, desires to make money, even if it 
means laundering money for a fee. Joe, however, has not laundered 
money in the past nor does he know where to seek the necessary in­
formation or contacts for laundering money. With the readiness re­
quirement, the court would find entrapment where the government 
incited Joe to launder money, taught him the procedures for launder­
ing, and configured the proper connections. Alternatively, if the gov­
ernment proved that prior to government contact Joe had the knowl­
edge, training and connections to commit the crime, the defense of 
entrapment would fail. 
In contrast, under the Skarie five-factor test, Joe's entrapment de­
fense would fail whether or not the government proved that Joe had 
the knowledge, training or connections to commit the crime. Since 
Joe was mentally prepared to launder money all along, his inability to 
actually launder the money would be inconsequential. Thus, under 
the five-factor test, the court would convict Joe despite the fact that he 
would never have laundered money without the government's prod­
ding and assistance. 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Thickstun, rejected the Sev­
enth Circuit's "readiness" element, arguing that it added a new ele­
ment to the predisposition requirement.29 The Court argued that the 
Supreme Court in Jacobson applied settled entrapment law and did 
not add a "positional" requirement to the entrapment inquiry. But, in 
the en bane re-hearing of the first Hollingsworth decision, the Seventh 
Circuit responded that they do not add, nor do they "suggest that 
Jacobson adds a new element to the entrapment defense [independent 
of] inducement and, most important, predisposition."30 Rather, the 
readiness element clarifies the meaning of predisposition and enables 
courts to distinguish predisposed defendants.31 
This Note defends the readiness requirement, contending that the 
Seventh Circuit interpreted Jacobson properly by clarifying the readi­
ness element of the predisposition inquiry. Part I argues that the 
readiness requirement was formulated in Jacobson and is a compro­
mise between the two enduring Supreme Court approaches to en­
trapment. Part II argues that although the sting is a powerful weapon 
of law enforcement, sting operations are inherently dangerous and the 
readiness requirement is the only approach that comprehensively pro-
29. United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997). 
30. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199. 
31. Id. at 1199. Hollingsworth II reemphasized the subtle but crucial distinction that 
Jacobson made: that courts should look at the defendant's likelihood of engaging in crinlinal 
behavior as opposed to the defendant's eagerness in responding to the solicitation. See 
Marcus, supra note 6, at 230 n.158. But see Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1398; Hollingsworth II, 
supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1206 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (disregarding the majority's explicit 
views and attacking tlle majority for creating a new element in entrapment cases). 
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tects against the sting's dangers. Part III demonstrates the need to 
consider the readiness requirement separately from the other five fac­
tors. Finally, Part III also argues that the readiness requirement does 
not, in any case, overburden the government in entrapment proceed­
ings. 
I. JACOBSON'S READINESS: COMPROMISING THE SUBJECTIVE AND 
OBJECTIVE APPROACHES 
Despite the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' feud over whether the 
readiness requirement is a necessary result of the Supreme Court's 
disposition in Jacobson, a strong argument can be made that the Su­
preme Court has been developing and attempting to articulate the 
readiness requirement ever since its first entrapment decision, with 
Jacobson serving as the culmination of this struggle. In debating their 
approaches to entrapment, from Sorrells v. United States32 through 
Mathews v. United States,33 the Supreme Court majorities (the "Ma­
jority") and dissents (the "Dissent") have adopted opposing views on 
entrapment, focusing on divergent particulars.34 A test focusing on the 
five factors and the readiness requirement presents a compromise 
upon which both camps can settle. 
Since its first entrapment decision, the Majority's approach has fo­
cused on the defendant's character and actions - the subjective ap­
proach. Under this subjective approach, after the defendant suffi­
ciently proves improper inducement, the burden shifts and the 
government is required to show a defendant's predisposition to com­
mit the crime prior to government contact; if it cannot, the defendant 
is acquitted and the government's misconduct is penalized.35 In con­
trast, the Dissent has advanced an objective approach, focusing on 
overzealous law enforcement and limiting the entrapment inquiry to 
32. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
33. 485 U.S. 58 (1988). 
34. Since the Supreme Court's first review of the entrapment defense in Casey v. United 
States, all of the Court's entrapment decisions have been close, magnifying the controversy 
surrounding this issue. 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (four dissenters); Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435 (1932) (four dissenters); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (four jus­
tices concur on the decision but disagree with the doctrine and advocate the objective ap­
proach); Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (four dissenters); Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (three dissenters); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) 
(two dissenters, one concurrence and disagreement with doctrine, and one justice did not 
take part in the decision; only five in the majority); Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 
(1992) (four dissenters). 
35. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548-49; see also United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623 
(11th Cir. 1995). In Hampton, Justice Powell went so far as to pronounce a per se rule that, 
"no matter what the circumstances, neither due process principles nor [the Court's] supervi­
sory power could support a bar to conviction in any case where the Government is able to 
prove predisposition." Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., con­
curring). 
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the government's actions. Under the objective approach, after proof 
of inducement, the burden remains with the defendant to further 
prove improper government conduct. Because the sole focus of the 
objective approach is on the conduct of the police, if the defendant 
proves improper conduct, the court will find entrapment.36 
The choice of approach affects the likelihood of conviction. Under 
the Majority's subjective approach, the government may rebut a 
showing of inducement with proof of predisposition, whereas under 
the Dissent's objective approach it may not. Therefore, under the 
objective approach, if the government's inducement is improper, it is 
impossible for the government to secure a conviction. In contrast, un­
der the subjective approach, even if the government improperly in­
duced the defendant, the government can obtain a conviction by 
showing the defendant's predisposition. As a result, the likelihood of 
a conviction in similar circumstances is greater under the subjective 
approach than the objective approach.37 
Although the objective approach has never prevailed as the Su­
preme Court's majority view, the approach's requirement of proper 
inducement to obtain a conviction, and the difficulty the government 
should confront in cases when it presents an improper inducement, are 
enduring concerns. The readiness requirement alleviates these con­
cerns by limiting the evidentiary weight given to government-induced 
crime through a test focusing on the defendant's ability prior to the 
government's appearance. 
In Jacobson, the Supreme Court effectively combined the concerns 
contained in the subjective and objective approaches in its predisposi­
tion doctrine. The doctrine addresses the dissent's concern for im­
proper government conduct by placing a heavy burden on the gov-
36. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). The Sherman dissent put it 
plainly: "a test that looks to the character and the predisposition of the defendant rather 
than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrap­
ment." 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
37. Critics have argued that the two approaches would reach a different result only in 
the case when the police reasonably, but incorrectly, believe the defendant to be predisposed 
at the time that the inducement is offered. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 163, 215-16 {1976). Under the subjective approach, because the government 
will not be able to prove predisposition, entrapment will be found; under the objective ap­
proach, because the inducement was reasonable, and therefore proper, the defense will fail. 
The strong possibility and frequency of the inverse case is overlooked by such critics. 
The government often presents a truly predisposed defendant with an egregious and im­
proper inducement. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 205-11. Under the subjective approach, the 
inducement can be tempered and a conviction can still be obtained if the government can 
prove predisposition. Yet under the objective approach, a conviction is impossible. 
Alternatively, it has recently been argued that the dichotomy between the two ap­
proaches is false because courts judge a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime by his 
reaction to government inducements, and the government's inducements are tailored to the 
defendant's particular characteristics. See Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive 
Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1151, 1175-76 (1995). 
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ernment. Jacobson's approach asks whether the defendant is a person 
who, but for the inducement offered, would not have conceived of or 
engaged in conduct of the sort induced, and gives the government's 
behavior paramount importance vis-a-vis the . defendant's mental 
state.38 The government's burden of proving predisposition under 
Jacobson is heavier than the burden as interpreted by Skarie, pre­
sented in the five-factor test. Thus, Jacobson's standard comes closer 
to the weighty burden of the objective approach. 
A textual analysis of the debate between the Jacobson majority 
and dissent confirms the intent of the Jacobson majority. In Jacobson, 
the majority and dissent explicitly disagreed about whether the gov­
ernment must prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit a 
crime prior to being approached by government agents or as of the 
time government agents first became involved with the defendant.39 
Underlying this conflict was the broader issue of whether proof of the 
defendant's willingness or enthusiasm to commit the crime is enough 
to defeat an entrapment defense or whether the government must 
prove more. In the case of complicated crimes, which Jacobson was 
not,40 the "more" is proof of readiness. 
At oral argument, the Jacobson Court asserted, and the govern­
ment conceded, that upon a showing of inducement, the government 
"must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was dis­
posed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by 
Government agents."41 In contrast, the Jacobson dissent argued that 
the Supreme Court has always held that predisposition is assessed as 
of the time the government first suggested the crime.42 The difference in 
time is quite critical. The majority's requirement advocates an inquiry 
into whether the crime resulted from the undercover agent's actions or 
purely from the defendant's prior inclinations, contacts and re­
sources.43 Under this query, evidence from events occurring prior to 
the government's initial contact with the defendant has much greater 
38. By requiring the government to prove that the defendant was disposed prior to first 
being approached by the government, the Court, although not explicitly, made a push to­
ward a test incorporating the spirit of the five factors and the readiness requirement. Al­
though conceived of earlier, this test was first fully defined in Marcus, supra note 6, at 234. 
39. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 556-57. 
40. Jacobson involved the unlawful receipt and possession of child pornography, a gar­
den-variety crime that does not require prior training, experience, or acquaintances for its 
commission. For a discussion of why the readiness requirement does not get snagged on 
garden-variety cases, see infra Part III. 
41. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added) (distinguishing between garden-variety 
crimes and more elaborate sting operations). 
42 Id. at 556-57; see also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1958); Sorrells 
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). 
43. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. 
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weight44 than that given to events occurring during the government's 
operation.45 The dissent disagreed. It examined the defendant's reac­
tions to the government's solicitations, from the time following the ini­
tial conversation until the .commission of the crime, as evidence of 
predisposition. 46 
Arguably, by establishing the "prior to first being approached " re­
quirement, Jacobson directs the government to prove that before its 
initial contact with the defendant, the defendant would and could have 
committed the crime.4 7 The majority's test seems to require the gov­
ernment to demonstrate that all the elements for the full commission 
of the crime were in place before the government entered onto the 
scene, which would necessarily include proof of a defendant's mental 
and physical ability to commit the crime.48 The structure of the ma­
jority's test indicates that a person who is not predisposed, mentally 
and positionally, "is not a threat to society and the criminal law has no 
proper concern with him, however evil his thoughts or deficient his 
character. "49 
On the other hand, the dissent's test, which asks the government to 
prove predisposition from the time the government first suggested the 
crime, penalizes the defendant for any influence the government may 
have had on the defendant from the time between the initial contact 
and the time that the government finally suggested the crime. That 
influence, when manifested in the defendant's reaction to the govern­
ment's eventual offer to commit the crime, is counted against the de­
fendant and can be used to prove predisposition.50 
Alternatively, the Jacobson test may be explained as requiring the 
government to prove that but for the government's influence, the de-
44. See id. (pointing out that preinvestigation proof of the defendant's previous receipt 
of child pornography, before it was a criminal offense, is "scant if any proof of .. . predispo· 
sition," it "merely indicates a generic inclination to act within a broad range, not all of which 
is criminal, [and] is of little probative value in establishing predisposition"). 
45. See id. at 551 n.3 (arguing that predisposition must be proven independently of the 
defendant's reaction to the government's coaxing). 
46. See id. at 555. 
47. Id. at 550 (focusing on whether preinvestigation evidence indicates more than 
merely "a generic inclination to act within a broad range"); see also id. at 557 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (clarifying the ramifications of the majority's test by stating that "the Govern­
ment must have sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition before it ever seeks to 
contact him") (emphasis omitted). 
48. Id. at 553 (stating that the prosecution's failing was that the defendant was only 
"ready and willing to commit the offense . . .  after the Government had devoted 2 % years to 
convincing him" to commit the offense). 
49. Hollingsworth I, supra note 7, 9 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). 
50. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 556-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing \vith the major­
ity's holding that "the Government must prove not only that a suspect was predisposed to 
commit the crime before the opportunity to commit it arose, but also before the Govern­
ment came on the scene"). 
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fendant would have committed the crime.51 The natural extension of 
the 'but for' test is that in the case of complex criminal acts,52 such as 
money laundering53 and illegal substance production,54 when training, 
experience, occupation or acquaintances are vital to the commission of 
the crime, the government must prove that even absent its 'help' the 
defendant was ready and able to commit the crime. Proof of ability is 
crucial; without it, no court can confidently state that a defendant 
would have committed a crime absent government inducement.55 
When the crime is one that does not require any specialized knowl­
edge, however, such as the sale of illegal substances, the government is 
absolved of this burden.56 The purpose of the "prior to first being ap­
proached " requirement is to obligate a showing of the defendant's 
readiness and ability to commit the act without governmental instruc­
tion or contacts.5 7 
The disposition of the Jacobson dissent indicates that the major­
ity's standard entails the readiness requirement. The dissent under­
stood that the majority's rule advocated a readiness requirement, and 
therefore argued that the Supreme Court has always held that predis­
position is to be assessed as of the time the government first suggested 
the crime.58 The dissent wanted to disregard any influence the gov­
ernment had on the defendant until the time of the suggestion of the 
crime and stressed only the defendant's ability after having been pre­
sented with the government's suggestion of crime.59 The "prior to first 
being approached " standard demonstrates an emphasis on a defen­
dant's background predating the initial contact with the government 
which may be couched as the readiness requirement.60 This result em-
51. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
52. The crimes that comprise this set of "complex criminal acts" will constantly change 
in accordance with the level of training, experience, occupation and acquaintances needed to 
commit specific crimes. 
53. In Hollingsworth II the government connected two financiers to the world of inter­
national money laundering, and provided them with the prdper underworld contacts, finan­
cial acumen and assets, and access to foreign banks and bankers. See Hollingsworth II, supra 
note 2, 27 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994). 
54. See United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 
1108 (1982) (involving illegal substance production where entrapment was found). 
55. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1202. 
56. See infra note 108. 
57. This test does not require pre-contact proof of the defendant's mental predisposition 
because mental predisposition is always proven through circiimstantial evidence procured 
during the sting, including the defendant's reaction to the government's offer. See United 
States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting the importance of considering the 
present circumstances in determining the mental predisposition of the defendant). 
58. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 556-57 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 556-57. 
60. Id. at 553. 
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bodies the majority's desire for a government showing of the defen­
dant's ability to commit the crime absent government intervention, 
which validates the sentiments of the objective approach and stresses 
the government's showing of proper inducement. 
II. THE READINESS REQUIREMENT Is NEEDED TO PREVENT THE 
DANGERS OF STING OPERATIONS 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a delicate balance must be 
maintained between the goals of the criminal justice system and law 
enforcement's weapons against crime.61 When its arsenal is used in an 
improper manner or at an improper time, the justice system's goals are 
not furthered and people's rights are often violated.62 One such 
weapon is the sting. The readiness requirement operates as the sting's 
safety lock, securing careful use of this law enforcement tool. Section 
II.A argues that an overzealous sting is contrary to public policy due 
to the inherent risks posed by sting operations and that the readiness 
requirement properly curbs such zeal. Section II.B argues that with­
out the readiness requirement, the possibility of other forms of sting 
abuse arises. 
A. The Riskiness of Stings Without the Readiness Requirement 
The sting operation is designed to catch predisposed defendants in 
natural circumstances, but the government can easily fail to simulate 
reality, either accidentally or purposefully.63 Therefore, the sting 
should be used with caution. To this end, the readiness requirement 
ensures that the government, when planning a sting operation, will 
consider whether it will later be able to meet its readiness burden. 
Moreover, the polar results possible in entrapment cases - conviction 
and thereby reward to the government on a successful sting or acquit­
tal and penalize the government for an operation gone bad - further 
demand careful policing of sting operations and therefore advocate a 
readiness requirement. The systematic preference to free a criminal 
rather than wrongfully convict an innocent party, articulated by 
61. See Sorrells v. United States, 2'ir'/ U.S. 435, 441-42 {1932) (recognizing that the same 
elements of the sting that enable it to further the goals of criminal justice lend to the ease of 
its misuse). 
62 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) {discussing a narcotics sting 
on a drug rehabilitation patient, and commenting that it is improper for the government to 
"play0 on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguileO him into committing crimes 
which he otherwise would not have attempted"). 
63. See Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 {1928) {Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
{pointing out that either accidentally or purposefully, the government, in its zeal to catch and 
punish, may provoke or create a crime and then seek to punish the criminal, its own crea­
ture). 
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Justice Holmes and quoted in the opening paragraph to this Note, fur­
ther supports the challenging governmental burden of the readiness 
requirement. 64 
The risks of sting use are numerous. The comment to § 2.13 of the 
Model Penal Code (Entrapment)65 states that "the chief aims of crimi­
nal law are to prevent people from engaging in socially harmful con­
duct and to instruct them in the basic requirements of good citizen­
ship. "66 In every sting there is a risk of offense by the innocent and a 
fostered increase in the criminal population. Undoubtedly, "[s]ome 
persons will . . tum to crime and risk the pain of punishment in re­
sponse to the call of law enforcement. "6 7 Second, when government 
agents are engaged in persuading citizens to commit criminal acts, they 
are neglecting their proper task of apprehending those offenders who 
act without encouragement.68 Third, the sting can easily be used by 
police officers to express personal malice through selective or mali­
cious prosecution.69 Finally, and most tragic, is the possibility of in­
juring the reputation of law enforcement institutions by employing 
methods shocking to the moral standards of the community.70 All 
these concerns point in favor of a stem governmental burden that will 
cue the government to think twice before planning a sting. 
Under the federal government's own guidance, a sting operation 
should not furnish to the target goods and . services that otherwise 
would be reasonably unavailable to him. Initially, the Attorney Gen-
64. See Moore, supra note 37, at 1187 ("[E)ntrapment was a public policy decision made 
by the Supreme Court in the guise of implied legislative intent." The defense is supported 
by a decision that "it is more important to acquit otherwise guilty people than to incarcerate 
them."). The Court has always based its endorsement of the entrapment defense on as­
sumed congressional intent and public policy. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 
(1973) (noting that the entrapment defense is rooted "in the notion that Congress could not 
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a 
proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government "); Sorrells, 287 U.S. 
at 450. 
65. Because entrapment is a common law defense, there is no statutory definition for it. 
A proposed statutory entrapment defense was organized but is not codified. See Undercover 
Operations Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Comm. on the Judici­
ary, 98th Cong. 19-20 (1984) [hereinafter Undercover Operations Act Hearings) (proposed 18 
U.S. C. § 16). The proposed statutory defense substituted an objective test for the current 
judicially accepted subjective test. See id. at 28. 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 commentary at 407 (1982). 
67. Id. at 406. 
68. See id.; see also Undercover Operations Act Hearings, supra note 65, at 4 (statement 
of Senator Patrick Leahy) ("We need a bill because we need guidelines that will protect in­
dividual citizens from the excessive zeal of an operation that wanders from its rightful goal 
and places the value of apparent success over the value of individual liberty. and privacy."). 
69. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.13 commentary at 406. 
70. See id.; see also United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 971 (1st Cir. 1994) (Pollack, 
J., concurring) (commenting that just because methods pursued by government agents to 
offer a tempting opportunity to commit a crime are successful and are found lawful "does 
not ... signify that those methods . .. are something to be proud of'). 
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eral's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations (the "Guidelines " )  
emphasizes that "[e]ntrapment should be scrupulously avoided." 71 
Furthermore, the Guidelines instruct that disposition exists when 
"there is a reasonable indication, based on information developed 
through informants or other means, that the subject is engaging, has 
engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activity of similar type. " 72 The 
proposed Undercover Operations Act, which would establish stan­
dards for conducting federal undercover operations, moves a step be­
yond the Guidelines and provides that a defendant cannot be prose­
cuted if the undercover officer "suppl[ies] an item or service that 
would be reasonably unavailable to [the] criminal actor . . .  but for the 
participation of the Government." 73 The readiness requirement ap­
propriately addresses these concerns· by requiring the government to 
prove that the target had attained everything to commit the crime 
prior to the government's appearance, except for the opportunity to 
commit the crime. 
In conformity with the Guidelines, Congress has, in the past, pro­
posed full acceptance of an irrebuttable affirmative statutory defense 
of inducement that effectively substitutes "an objective test, for the 
subjective 'predisposition' test." 74 The Subcommittee on Criminal 
Law of the Committee on the Judiciary (hereinafter the "Subcommit­
tee " ) explained that the proposed Undercover Operations Act seeks 
to deter the worst potential abuses of the undercover technique and 
the overreaching tactics sometimes used in sting operations.75 Recog­
nizing the apparent danger in sting operations, in its latest proposed 
draft of the Undercover Operations Act (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 16), 
the subcommittee discouraged undercover agents from commencing 
stings by prohibiting the use of undercover agents in preliminary in­
quiries when there is not a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.76 Such 
a rule reflects the same spirit as the readiness requirement. 
Although the sting has numerous potentially severe pitfalls that 
the government has tried to avoid statutorily, if the power that creates 
such weighty negative effects is harnessed properly, an extremely ef­
fective tool of law enforcement can be created. Ideally, the sting op-
71. See Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations (Dec. 31, 198 0), 
reprinted in S. REP. No. 97-682, at 550 (1982) (applicable only to federal law enforcement 
authorities). 
72 Id. at 551. 
73. Undercover Operations Act Hearings, supra note 65, at 12. 
74. Id. at27. 
75. See id. at 25. 
76. See id. at 33. 
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eration should advance one of law enforcement's primary goals: crime 
prevention.77 
The advantages of the sting, and specifically, the advance of crimi­
nal prevention, can be seen most clearly in the.context of a drug bust. 
The drug bust is the most common form of police solicitation or assis­
tance to commit a crime.78 In a bust, the police send an undercover 
agent to buy narcotics from a drug dealer who is then prosecuted for 
possession of an illegal substance with the intent to sell. In this sce­
nario, and in all other stings, the court punishes a defendant for a 
harmless act, since the narcotics are taken by the undercover agent 
into police custody. Prevention, therefore, must be the rationale be­
hind the sting operation. While the sale. to the undercover agent is 
harmless, "it is altogether likely that the dealer, unless prevented, will 
make illegal sales" to .others, spreading the dangers of drug use and 
the drug trade.79 
The presumption that criminals caught through sting operations 
would have acted in the same mannedf a private individual presented 
the same opportunity ("realistic circumstances") enables courts to 
conclude that a proper sting operation can achieve prevention.80 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has instructed that "in holding out in­
ducements [the government] should act in such a manner as is likely to 
induce to the commission of crime only these persons and not others 
who would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordi­
nary temptations. "81 
In the spirit of prevention, the execution of a sting operation has 
four advantages over the alternative of waiting until the crime is actu-
77. See Sorrells v. United States, 2Zl U.S. 435, 444 (1932) (declaring the sole purpose of 
a sting to be the prevention of crime). The Court pr:oceeded to condemn the practice of in­
citing and creating crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it. The Court 
reasoned that such motives were contrary to the public policy of reducing the number of 
crimes and crinlinals. See id. 
78. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1220 (1985). 
79. Id. 
80. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962-63 (1st Cir. 1994); see also 
Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he [G]overnment may 
not, in trying to induce the target of a sting to commit a crime, confront him with circum­
stances that are different from the ordinary or typical circumstances of a private induce­
ment."). Chief Justice Warren's oft-quoted aphorism that "a line must be drawn between 
the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary crinlinal, " Sherman v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958), can be seen in two lights. Most often this quote is used to 
buttress the proposition that a defendant must be ready and willing to commit the charged 
crime before the government offers the inducement. Yet, the same words can be used to 
argue that the government's tactics must also be of the "ready and willing "  type normally 
encountered on the street. In essence, this Note argues that both aspects of the crime must 
be of the ready and willing type - the nature of the inducement and the position of the in­
duced - if the conviction is to withstand a defense of entrapment. 
81. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958). 
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ally committed on the public: (1) safety, (2) cost, (3) administrative 
ease, and (4) the apprehension of violators of victimless crimes.82 The 
sting is a device that makes it safer to catch criminals.83 The govern­
ment and the undercover agent control, and are the lone characters in, 
the fiction that assures that either a criminal will be caught, or if not, 
that at least no member of the public will be hurt. A true crime, where 
the government exercises less control, presents the danger that the 
criminal will not be caught and that an innocent person will be 
harmed. Furthermore, a sting is a cheaper and easier method of 
catching a criminal than is apprehending a criminal in his ordinary 
criminal activities. If the government is correct in assessing the defen­
dant's criminal inclination, it can direct the criminal's every move 
rather than anticipate it, rightly or wrongly.84 Finally, the sting cir­
cumvents a dilemma posed by the victimless crime, an obstacle to tra­
ditional law enforcement.85 In victimless criminal activity involving 
drugs or corruption, no direct participant wants the crime detected. 
Because direct participants are often the only ones with knowledge of 
the crime, it is difficult for law enforcement agencies to obtain knowl­
edge of the crime, prevent it, and punish the actors. In the case of a 
sting, the government is a unique direct participant who wants the 
crime detected. 
In sum, the sting is a powerful but dangerous device of law en­
forcement and its use should be limited. The readiness requirement 
draws the court and the government closer to ensuring that sting op­
erations nab only predisposed violators of the law. Requiring proof of 
readiness presents the government with the difficulty of clarifying the 
line between the government's inducement and the defendant's own 
means.86 This requirement and resulting difficulty would decrease the 
chances of a case of improper inducement meeting full proof of pre­
disposition by the government. Under current entrapment doctrine, 
the option of both convicting a defendant who pleads entrapment and 
somehow punishing the government for an improper inducement does 
not exist. Therefore, if the government improperly procured a defen­
dant's actions through a sting, and the defendant's readiness to com­
mit the crime without government involvement is questionable, courts 
82. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in 
judgement); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Gendron, 18 F. 3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994); Posner, supra note 78, at 1220. 
83. See Posner, supra note 78, at 1220. 
84. See id. 
85. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Russell, 411 
U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (pointing out that absent the sting, "many crimes, espe­
cially so-called victimless crimes, could not otherwise be detected"). 
86. Without this requirement, the burden falls on the defendant to prove that the in­
ducement was too strong and created the crime. 
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should prefer acquittal and reprimand. In light of that preference, the 
readiness requirement more definitely ensures conviction of a would­
be criminal than the five-factor test alone. 
B. Readiness Takes the "Sting" Out of Entrapment 
The readiness requirement, unlike the five-factor test, ensures that 
when a defendant is "stung " under unrealistic circumstances, entrap­
ment is found.8 7 The five-factor test does not account for cases in 
which the government fails to simulate reality, and thus lures a defen­
dant who is not predisposed into criminal activity. 
There are three ways the government may entrap a defendant. 
The first possible failing of a sting is over-inducement, where the de­
fendant is almost forced to commit the crime.88 The second possible 
failing is the entrapment of a first-time criminal.89 The third failing is 
the punishment of bad thoughts rather than of the predisposition to 
commit a crime.90 The five-factor test protects against conviction in 
the first two cases, but erroneously convicts the third class of defen­
dants.91 The readiness requirement is vital to protect defendants with 
bad thoughts but no predisposition from conviction. 
87. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he gov­
ernment may not, in trying to induce the target of a sting to commit a crime, confront him 
with circumstances that are different from the ordinary or typical circumstances of a private 
inducement"). 
88. See United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 n.11 (5th Cir. 1997), affd en bane sub 
nom United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 525 U.S. 973 (1998) 
(noting that the government's inducement was similar to the price for money laundering but 
gave the defendants interest-free use of millions of dollars for several years, with low 
monthly payments and a large balloon payment); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (en bane). 
89. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435, 440 (1932). There is a special sympathy and hesitation for the conviction of first­
time offenders who are caught by a sting. In light of this, the government must have reason 
to conduct a sting before co=encing a sting on a never-before convicted person. The ap­
prehension of a first-time offender by means of a sting automatically evokes questions about 
the defendant's character. 
90. In Jacobson the Supreme Court plainly stated that the aim of sting operations is not 
to test and punish the target's morals; "a person's inclinations and 'fantasies . . .  are his own 
and beyond the reach of government . . . .  ' "  Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551-52 
(1992) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973)). 
These three flaws are not mutually exclusive; a case could be unsavory for one or more 
reasons. In Jacobson, where the government coerced an Indiana farmer for two and a half 
years to purchase child pornography, all three flaws were present. The government imposed 
extreme measures by coercing Jacobson for 30 months; Jacobson was a first-time offender 
(this was his first time purchasing child pornography since the enactment of the Child Pro­
tection Act of 1984, which made receipt of child pornography through the mail for noncom­
mercial use a crime). The government created unrealistic circumstances by appealing for the 
same cause through five fictitious organizations, ranging from sexually related retail compa­
nies to research and legislative organizations to a bogus pen pal. See id. at 543. 
91. See United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1992). Under the five-factor 
test, when the government employs excessive measures (the first category of entrapment) to 
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The third type of entrapment occurs in cases in which the govern­
ment presents a defendant with circumstances that defy reality.92 As 
stated previously, the purpose of a sting operation is to catch predis­
posed criminals in circumstances that harm no one. Therefore, if the 
sting eliminates inevitable harm, it logically follows that the proper 
target of a sting, a predisposed criminal, is someone who has at least 
the ability, if not the will, to commit the crime at the moment of in­
ducement or soon afterward. Otherwise, the defendant could not be 
considered harmful.93 Accordingly, a sting operation that furnishes the 
defendant with education, contacts, or tools vital to the crime that the 
defendant could not readily come by on his own, does not reveal a de­
fendant's predisposition to the crime; it only reveals his bad thoughts.94 
Moreover, to punish such a defendant would be punishing him for bad 
pressure a defendant to commit a crime, there is a rebuttable presumption of entrapment 
supported by the nature of inducement and the defendant's limited reluctance to the crime 
- factors (4) and (5) of the five-factor test. Sel! id. The government may rebut this pre­
sumption through evidence that the criminal has previously engaged in similar criminal acts, 
first suggested the criminal activity, or engaged in the activity for profit - factors (1), (2), 
and (3). See id. The purpose of accounting for the extreme nature of the inducement is to 
ensure that the government is not turning an investigation of whether the defendant is 
breaking the law into an investigation of whether the defendant can be induced to break the 
law - an improper motive for a sting. See Posner, supra note 78, at 1220 ("Police induce­
ments that merely affect the timing and not the level of criminal activity are socially produc­
tive; those that increase the crime level are not."). 
With regard to the second category of entrapped defendants, the five-factor test requires 
consideration of a defendant's character and whether the defendant demonstrated reluc­
tance to commit the crime. See supra notes 7, 14. 
92 See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994). 
Suppose that an undercover government agent, with knowledge that someone (Joe) 
holds a foreign banking license, but with no knowledge of whether Joe has previously laun­
dered or desires to launder money, approaches Joe and asks him whether he would like to 
make money as a money launderer. Joe answers, "Sure, but I don't know anything about 
laundering." In response, the government agent agrees to instruct Joe on how to use his for­
eign license to launder money; to connect him to underworld contacts, foreign banks and 
bankers, and to feed Joe the financial acumen and assets needed to commit the crime of 
laundering. See id. {presenting a similar scenario in a counterfeiting case). For those unde­
cided about whether Joe should have a valid entrapment defense, consider Hollingsworth II 
where even the government's lawyer admitted that "the counterfeiter would have a strong 
case that he had been being entrapped, even though he was perfectly willing to commit the 
crime once the government planted the suggestion and showed him how and the government 
neither threatened him nor offered him an overwhelming inducement." Id. 
93. Bad thoughts are never harmful in the context of active crimes. See id. ("Predisposi­
tion is not purely a mental state, the state of being willing to swallow the government's bait. 
It has positional as well as dispositional force . . . .  (Hlad the court in Jacobson believed that 
the legal concept of predisposition is exhausted in the demonstrated willingness of the de­
fendant to commit the crime without threats or promises by the government, then Jacobson 
was predisposed, in which event the Court's reversal of his conviction would be difficult to 
explain."). 
94. For example, to get into the international money-laundering business, you need un­
derworld contacts, financial acumen or assets, or access to foreign banks or bankers. See id. 
at 1202. Drug manufacturing demands scientific knowledge, equipment and chemicals. See 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 425 (1973). 
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thoughts rather than for a bad act - a result that is at odds with prin­
ciples of criminal justice,95 and that is not the government's function.96 
Law enforcement's proper use of criminal law in a progressive society 
is to regulate potentially harmful conduct for the protection of society; 
not to purify minds and perfect character.97 Therefore, a sting must be 
based on a defendant's ability to do harm rather than simply on bad 
thoughts - exactly what readiness requires. 
Cases in which the government induces a defendant in ways differ­
ent from reality are not covered under any of the Ninth Circuit's five 
factors. The readiness requirement compels the government to estab­
lish that a defendant's commission of the crime occurred under realis­
tic circumstances - the only proper way to catch criminals without 
first allowing them to harm the public.98 The readiness requirement of 
predisposition must be embraced to keep sting operations functioning 
properly, free from concern about an erroneous conviction. 
III. THE READINESS REQUIREMENT DOES NOT OVERDETER GOOD 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Contrary to the assertion of the Hollingsworth dissent and other 
courts that have since disagreed with the Hollingsworth majority, the 
readiness requirement does not overdeter good law enforcement.99 It 
operates with precision, releasing criminals who submit to unrealistic 
circumstances while convicting those criminals who are caught 
through sting operations that simulate reality. The readiness require­
ment does not protect defendants who have the means to commit the 
crime or would probably have been presented with such means by a 
private citizen. The requirement is further sharpened by: (1) holding 
that the lack of readiness alone is not enough to establish entrapment, 
95. Since its first entrapment decision, the Supreme Court has seen the purpose of the 
sting as limited to revealing criminal design and disclosing predisposed violators of the law, 
not testing defendants' morals and thresholds. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 
384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) ("Human nature is weak enough and suffi­
ciently beset by temptations without government adding to them and generating crime"); 
Sorrells v. United States, 2B7 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). 
96. See Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the 
Creation of Crime, 4 LAW & PHIL. 17, 34 (1985) ("[This is] an interesting piece of data for 
God, but not for the FBI."). A person who has dreams of criminality, but has no means of 
living them, is harmless and must be left alone. See id: 
97. See id. at 33-34. 
98. The defendant is predisposed if he would have committed the same crime, in cir­
cumstances that would have made it harder for the police to catch him, if he had not fallen 
into the police trap. There is no benefit derived from catching a person who would not have 
done the crime otherwise. See Posner, supra note 78, at 1220. 
99. See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997); Hollingsworth II, 
supra note 2, 27 F.3d 1196, 1211 (7th Cir. 1994) (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
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and (2) remaining distinct from the five factors of the Ninth Circuit. 
Finally, the readiness requirement does not create an impasse for con­
viction in garden-variety drug and arms sales or bribery cases, nor 
does it provide the competent criminal who pretends to be disorgan­
ized with insurance against arrest. 
The readiness requirement presents the government with two op­
tions: to prove either (1) that the defendant, alone, was positionally 
ready and able to commit the crime, which means that the defendant 
had the idea for the crime all worked out, felt the desire to commit the 
crime, and lacked only the present means to commit it, or (2 ) that it is 
likely that if the government had not induced the defendant to commit 
the crime, some private party would have induced him.100 In these two 
scenarios, the government simply furnishes the opportunity to commit 
the crime to someone already predisposed to commit it. 
Realizing that the strong emphasis it put on readiness might be 
misunderstood, the Hollingsworth court qualified its position and 
stated that "[w]e do not wish to be understood as holding that lack of 
present means to commit a crime is alone enough to establish entrap­
ment if the government supplies the means."101 The government's 
failure to prove readiness does not automatically lead to a finding of 
entrapment. Therefore, a defendant who suggests the commission of a 
crime to a government agent and seeks out the undercover's help but 
personally lacks the means to commit the crime should be convicted. 
This is an obvious result that would be questionable under the facts 
presented by Hollingsworth, if not for the limitation on readiness. 
Additionally, for the readiness requirement to be effective, it must 
be considered separately from the other five factors. The language 
used by the Jacobson majority to counter the dissent's argument that 
the majority created a new factor may foster the belief that the major­
ity only added a sixth readiness factor to the existing five-factor test, 
and did not intend readiness to be an element separate from the five­
factor test.102 This must be incorrect. The inquiry into readiness must 
be separate from the five-factor test because without proof of readi­
ness, a court cannot find a defendant predisposed. If readiness were 
merely a sixth factor, courts could easily mitigate its importance by 
100. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1200, 1203. Proof of probability of 
private intervention is not needed in cases in which the government did not need to provide 
means to the defendant for commission of the crime, due to the defendant's prior acumen or 
the simplicity of the crime. 
101. Id. at 1202. 
102 See id. at 1199-1200. This Note contends that although readiness is not a new ele­
ment added to the entrapment defense, it is a factor to be evaluated separately from the five 
factors, and it is to be allotted distinct weight. 
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emphasizing the other factors in their analyses. The five factors are 
balanced, whereas readiness is indispensable.103 
The Seventh Circuit stated that it did not interpret Jacobson to add 
a new element to the entrapment defense on top of inducement and 
predisposition.104 But the Seventh Circuit did not clearly state whether 
the proof of readiness is to be considered separately from the five fac­
tors or simply as a sixth factor. This distinction would determine 
whether or not proof of other factors could outweigh the govern­
ment's failure to meet the burden of the readiness requirement. If 
readiness is nothing more than a sixth factor, proof of other factors 
could easily compensate for the government's failure to prove readi­
ness. In contrast, if readiness is an independent factor that is given 
more weight than any of the five factors, a very strong showing of pre­
disposition from the five factors ·would be needed to compensate for 
the absence of readiness proof. 
The Hollingsworth court plainly stated, 
[t]he defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or ex­
perience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the gov­
ernment had not induced him to commit the crime some criminal would 
have done so; only then does a sting or other arranged crime take a dan­
gerous person out of circulation.105 
Therefore, although readiness may not be a "new element to the en­
trapment defense," the readiness requirement must be an element of 
the predisposition inquiry that is independent from the five factors 
and imperative to overcoming an entrapment defense. Even though 
lack of readiness alone is not enough to establish entrapment if the 
government supplies the means, under Hollingsworth a defendant 
cannot be convicted when the defendant raises a colorable defense of 
entrapment and readiness is not shown.106 A "colorable case" is when 
some of the other factors indicate, even if not conclusively, a lack of 
predisposition.107 
Although the readiness requirement burdens the government with 
proof of present means or likely inducement by another, it does not 
create an insurmountable burden in garden-variety drug, arms, and 
103. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 327 (describing the Seventh Circuit's use of the 
readiness factor in Hollingsworth as a separate and independent prong of the entrapment 
analysis). Rothstein argues that if the Hollingsworth court used the readiness requirement 
as one of the several factors pertinent to the predisposition analysis and not as a separate 
element, the other factors would have clearly demonstrated the existence of predisposition. 
See id. 
104. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1199-1200. 
105. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). 
106. See id. at 1203. 
107. See id. 
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bribery cases.108 Commission of crimes like these, which do not de­
mand any technical or particular training, experience, occupation, or 
acquaintances, can be characterized as crimes that the defendant im­
plicitly has the readiness to commit. Indeed, because these crimes do 
not have any technical demands, everyone has readiness to commit 
them. This idea was expressed by the Supreme Court in Jacobson: 
"In such a typical case . . .  where the defendant is simply provided with 
the opportunity to commit a crime, the entrapment defense is of little 
use because the ready commission of the criminal act amply demon­
strates the defendant's predisposition."109 Specifically, "[a] public offi­
cial is in a position to take bribes; a drug addict to deal drugs; a gun 
dealer to engage in illegal gun sales."110 In such cases, when readiness 
is assumed, mental predisposition is all that the government needs to 
show.111 
Finally, in non-garden-variety cases, the readiness requirement 
does not provide arrest insurance for the competent criminal who is 
sufficiently studied in his way of doing business so as to appear unor­
ganized and therefore reliant upon the government's means.112 Readi­
ness simply forces the government to be alert when fashioning the 
sting. Theoretically, an expert criminal could make himself seem reli­
ant on government means and therefore entrapped. But this argu­
ment assumes that the criminal somehow knows that he is the focus of 
a sting operation. Otherwise, why would he pretend to be reliant?113 
108. In Thickstun the court rejected the readiness requirement and argued that "[s]uch a 
rule would be especially problematic in bribery cases. A person is never 'positionally' able 
to bribe a public official without cooperation from that official." 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th 
Cir. 1997). The Hollingsworth I dissent made the same argument in reference to the sale of 
narcotics. See Hollingsworth I, supra note 7, 9 F.3d 593, 605-06 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting). 
The Supreme Court in Jacobson and the Seventh Circuit in Hollingsworth have dis­
missed this argument, stating that through the criminal act itself, the defendant demonstrates 
his ability to commit the crime. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1992); 
Hollingsworth I, supra note 7, 9 F3d at 601. Unfortunately, due to the prevalence of bribe 
takers and drug sellers and buyers, defendants are always positionally able to bribe and con· 
duct transaction involving drugs; whether the defendant can identify a particular taker or 
buyer at the moment is inconsequential. 
109. 503 U.S. at 549-50. 
110. Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1200. Whether a seasoned or occasional 
drug trafficker is involved, the government does not have a readiness requirement in drug 
cases. 
111. See id. at 1200. In addition, the court in Hollingsworth I correctly concluded that 
the readiness requirement "has no implications at all for the garden-variety drug cases in 
which tlte defense of entrapment is most frequently, but futilely, raised." Hollingsworth I, 
supra note 7, 27 F.3d at 601. 
112. The "first-rate arrest insurance" argument was made by Judge Ripple in his 
Hollingsworth II dissent. See Hollingsworth II, supra note 2, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, J., dis­
senting). 
113. The argument that the defendant may simply be covering his bases defies logic. 
That argument assumes that the defendant always covers his bases, because he does not 
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Furthermore, even assuming that a defendant is a constant actor, if the 
government cannot prove readiness, how could we be sure that the de­
fendant is a seasoned criminal and not a reliant first-timer? In such 
cases, we should return to Justice Holmes's early preference for free­
ing a criminal rather than wrongfully convicting an innocent party, and 
the "actor" is acquitted. 
CONCLUSION 
After 100 years, courts may finally be approaching a settlement of 
the confusing and morally disturbing entrapment doctrine. Imperative 
to this settlement is the inclusion of the readiness requirement. Critics 
have interpreted the revitalization of the objective approach and rise 
of the readiness requirement as being overly sympathetic to the en­
trapped defendant. But the interpretation introduced in the doctrine's 
early days by Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, that the objective ap­
proach is just a shift toward closer scrutiny of government inducement, 
cannot be forgotten.114 
Inducement and predisposition are two sides of the same coin, and 
two ways of naming the same burden, differing only as to which party 
bears the burden.115 Inducement places the burden on the defendant 
and predisposition places the burden on the government. In light of 
this relationship, as an alternative to the government's burden of 
proving readiness, the readiness requirement could easily be recharac­
terized and the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that the gov­
ernment provided means that the defendant did not previously pos­
sess. Furthermore, the inquiries as to "who first suggested the 
criminal activity" and "the nature of the government's inducement" 
within the five-factor test seem to belong on the inducement side of 
the coin and should be placed on the defendant. One might argue that 
the defendant should be burdened with some of these factors because, 
in the case of an entrapment plea, the defendant has already been 
proven guilty of committing the crime and must now defend against 
his conviction. 
know when the government may present him with a sting. Always covering his bases means 
that for every crime, either genuine or sting, the defendant would have to appear reliant on 
his accomplice. This proposition is not realistic. No criminal would operate under the con­
stant debilitation of acting reliant when he is not. 
114. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in the result) ("[A] test that looks to the character and the predisposition of the defendant 
rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of 
entrapment."); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
115. "[I]nducement is significant chiefly as evidence bearing on predisposition: the 
greater the inducement, the weaker the inference that in yielding to it the defendant demon­
strated that he was predisposed to commit the crime in question." Hollingsworth II, supra 
note 2, 27 F.3d at 1200. 
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The bare fact that these great burdens that could justly be placed 
on the defendant rest on the government's shoulders demonstrates 
that the entrapment defense inherently directs scrutiny toward the 
government. This heightened scrutiny may be a statement about the 
ethical underpinnings of law enforcement in America today - about 
placing safeguards on how low the government will go to get its man. 
